| 181 | 1 | The assessment of natural hazards needs to be sufficiently conservative. The consideration of mainly historical data in the establishment of the design basis of NPPs is not sufficient to characterize the risks of extreme natural hazards. Even when comprehensive data are available, due to the relatively short observation periods, large uncertainties remain in the prediction of natural hazards. | Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources | Siting/Site Evaluation; Design; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 182 | 2 | The safety of NPPs needs to be re-evaluated on a periodic basis to consider advances in knowledge, and necessary corrective actions or compensatory measures need to be implemented promptly. | Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Safety Assessment; Nuclear Power Plants; Site Evaluation; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO) | Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 183 | 3 | The assessment of natural hazards needs to consider the potential for their occurrence in combination, either simultaneously or sequentially, and their combined effects on an NPP. The assessment of natural hazards also needs to consider their effects on multiple units at an NPP. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Research Reactors; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Fuel Cycle Facilities | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Siting/Site Evaluation; Design; Decommissioning; Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 184 | 4 | Operating experience programmes need to include experience from both national and international sources. Safety improvements identified through operating experience programmes need to be implemented promptly. The use of operating experience needs to be evaluated periodically and independently. | Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation | | | | Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources | Design; Construction; Operation; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Closure and post closure | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 185 | 5 | The defence in depth concept remains valid, but implementation of the concept needs to be strengthened at all levels by adequate independence, redundancy, diversity and protection against internal and external hazards. There is a need to focus not only on accident prevention, but also on improving mitigation measures. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors | | | | Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Safety Assessment; Transport of Radioactive Materials; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities | Regulatory Bodies; Operators; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Users of radiation sources | Design; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 186 | 6 | Instrumentation and control systems that are necessary during beyond design basis accidents need to remain operable in order to monitor essential plant safety parameters and to facilitate plant operations. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Design; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 187 | 7 | Robust and reliable cooling systems that can function for both design basis and beyond design basis conditions need to be provided for the removal of residual heat. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Site Evaluation | Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services | Operation; Design | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 188 | 8 | There is a need to ensure a reliable confinement function for beyond design basis accidents to prevent significant release of radioactive material to the environment. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions | | Radioactivity in the environment | | Safety Assessment; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Vendors of nuclear equipment and services | Design; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 189 | 9 | Comprehensive probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses need to be performed to confirm the capability of a plant to withstand applicable beyond design basis accidents and to provide a high degree of confidence in the robustness of the plant design. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Safety Assessment; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Site Evaluation; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services | Design; Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 190 | 10 | Accident management provisions need to be comprehensive, well designed and up to date. They need to be derived on the basis of a comprehensive set of initiating events and plant conditions and also need to provide for accidents that affect several units at a multi-unit plant. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | | | Safety Assessment; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Design; Operation; Commissioning; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 191 | 11 | Training, exercises and drills need to include postulated severe accident conditions to ensure that operators are as well prepared as possible. They need to include the simulated use of actual equipment that would be deployed in the management of a severe accident. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | | Radiation protection | | Management Systems; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Safety Assessment; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizations | Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 192 | 12 | In order to ensure effective regulatory oversight of the safety of nuclear installations, it is essential that the regulatory body is independent and possesses legal authority, technical competence and a strong safety culture. | Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of regulatory effectiveness | | | | Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Government; Regulatory Bodies | Closure and post closure; Commissioning; Construction; Decommissioning; Design; Operation; Remediation; Removal from Regulatory Control; Siting/Site Evaluation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 193 | 13 | In order to promote and strengthen safety culture, individuals and organizations need to continuously challenge or re-examine the prevailing assumptions about nuclear safety and the implications of decisions and actions that could affect nuclear safety. | Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Assessment of human and organizational factors | | | | Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizations | Siting/Site Evaluation; Design; Construction; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 194 | 14 | A systemic approach to safety needs to consider the interactions between human, organizational and technical factors. This approach needs to be taken through the entire life cycle of nuclear installations. | Assessment of human and organizational factors | | | | Management Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Users of radiation sources; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Nuclear education and training organizations; Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Siting/Site Evaluation; Design; Construction; Commissioning; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=86 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=86 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 195 | 15 | In preparing for the response to a possible nuclear emergency, it is necessary to consider emergencies that could involve severe damage to nuclear fuel in the reactor core or to spent fuel on the site, including those involving several units at a multi-unit plant possibly occurring at the same time as a natural disaster. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external events | Protecting emergency workers; Protecting the public | Radiation exposure; Radiation protection | | Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Research Reactors; Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation | Government; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Nuclear education and training organizations; Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=109 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=109 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 196 | 16 | The emergency management system for response to a nuclear emergency needs to include clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the operating organization and for local and national authorities. The system, including the interactions between the operating organization and the authorities, needs to be regularly tested in exercises. | Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors | Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the public; Protecting emergency workers | | | Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Government; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizations | Commissioning; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 197 | 17 | Emergency workers need to be designated, assigned clearly specified duties, regardless of which organization they work for, be given adequate training, and be properly protected during an emergency. Arrangements need to be in place to integrate into the response those emergency workers who had not been designated prior to the emergency, and helpers who volunteer to assist in the emergency response. | Assessment of human and organizational factors | Protecting emergency workers | Radiation exposure; Radiation protection | | Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel | Commissioning; Operation; Decommissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 198 | 18 | Arrangements need to be in place to allow decisions to be made on the implementation of predetermined urgent protective actions for the public, based on predefined plant conditions. | | Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the public | | | Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Government; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Emergency preparedness and response personnel; NGOs | Operation; Decommissioning; Commissioning | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 199 | 19 | Arrangements need to be in place to enable urgent protective actions to be extended or modified in response to developing plant conditions or monitoring results. Arrangements are also needed to enable early protective actions to be initiated on the basis of monitoring results. | | Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the public | | | Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Government; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); NGOs | Commissioning; Decommissioning; Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |
| 200 | 20 | Arrangements need to be in place to ensure that protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear emergency do more good than harm. A comprehensive approach to decision making needs to be in place to ensure that this balance is achieved. | | Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the public | Radiation protection | | Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive Materials | Government; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; NGOs; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO) | Construction; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Operation | http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=111 | <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=111 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> | |