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Key Message
Safety Assessment
  
Emergency Preparedness and Response
  
Radiological Consequences
  
Post-accident Recovery
  
IAEA Safety Standards
  
Target Audience
  
Lifetime Operation
  
  
  
  
181
1
The assessment of natural hazards needs to be sufficiently conservative. The consideration of mainly historical data in the establishment of the design basis of NPPs is not sufficient to characterize the risks of extreme natural hazards. Even when comprehensive data are available, due to the relatively short observation periods, large uncertainties remain in the prediction of natural hazards.
Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsSafety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal FacilitiesOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sourcesSiting/Site Evaluation; Design; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83
  
182
2
The safety of NPPs needs to be re-evaluated on a periodic basis to consider advances in knowledge, and necessary corrective actions or compensatory measures need to be implemented promptly.
Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsSafety Assessment; Nuclear Power Plants; Site Evaluation; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle FacilitiesOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO)Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83
  
183
3
The assessment of natural hazards needs to consider the potential for their occurrence in combination, either simultaneously or sequentially, and their combined effects on an NPP. The assessment of natural hazards also needs to consider their effects on multiple units at an NPP.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsSafety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Research Reactors; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Fuel Cycle FacilitiesOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Emergency preparedness and response personnelSiting/Site Evaluation; Design; Decommissioning; Operationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=83
  
184
4
 
Operating experience programmes need to include experience from both national and international sources. Safety improvements identified through operating experience programmes need to be implemented promptly. The use of operating experience needs to be evaluated periodically and independently.
Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operationEmergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sourcesDesign; Construction; Operation; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Closure and post closurehttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84
  
185
5
The defence in depth concept remains valid, but implementation of the concept needs to be strengthened at all levels by adequate independence, redundancy, diversity and protection against internal and external hazards. There is a need to focus not only on accident prevention, but also on improving mitigation measures.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factorsGovernmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Safety Assessment; Transport of Radioactive Materials; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle FacilitiesRegulatory Bodies; Operators; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Users of radiation sourcesDesign; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84
  
186
6
Instrumentation and control systems that are necessary during beyond design basis accidents need to remain operable in order to monitor essential plant safety parameters and to facilitate plant operations.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsEmergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnelDesign; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84
  
187
7
Robust and reliable cooling systems that can function for both design basis and beyond design basis conditions need to be provided for the removal of residual heat.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsNuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Site EvaluationTechnical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and servicesOperation; Designhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84
  
188
8
There is a need to ensure a reliable confinement function for beyond design basis accidents to prevent significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functionsRadioactivity in the environmentSafety Assessment; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Vendors of nuclear equipment and servicesDesign; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=84
  
189
9
Comprehensive probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses need to be performed to confirm the capability of a plant to withstand applicable beyond design basis accidents and to provide a high degree of confidence in the robustness of the plant design.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Application of the defence in depth concept; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsSafety Assessment; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Site Evaluation; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsTechnical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and servicesDesign; Operationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85
  
190
10
Accident management provisions need to be comprehensive, well designed and up to date. They need to be derived on the basis of a comprehensive set of initiating events and plant conditions and also need to provide for accidents that affect several units at a multi-unit plant.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsSafety Assessment; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnelDesign; Operation; Commissioning; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85
  
191
11
Training, exercises and drills need to include postulated severe accident conditions to ensure that operators are as well prepared as possible. They need to include the simulated use of actual equipment that would be deployed in the management of a severe accident.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsRadiation protectionManagement Systems; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Safety Assessment; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizationsOperationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85
  
192
12
In order to ensure effective regulatory oversight of the safety of nuclear installations, it is essential that the regulatory body is independent and possesses legal authority, technical competence and a strong safety culture.
Assessment of human and organizational factors; Assessment of regulatory effectivenessGovernmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsGovernment; Regulatory BodiesClosure and post closure; Commissioning; Construction; Decommissioning; Design; Operation; Remediation; Removal from Regulatory Control; Siting/Site Evaluationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85
  
193
13
In order to promote and strengthen safety culture, individuals and organizations need to continuously challenge or re-examine the prevailing assumptions about nuclear safety and the implications of decisions and actions that could affect nuclear safety.
Application of operating experience to improve plant design and operation; Assessment of human and organizational factorsGovernmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Users of radiation sources; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizationsSiting/Site Evaluation; Design; Construction; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Operationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=85
  
194
14
A systemic approach to safety needs to consider the interactions between human, organizational and technical factors. This approach needs to be taken through the entire life cycle of nuclear installations.
Assessment of human and organizational factorsManagement Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Vendors of nuclear equipment and services; Users of radiation sources; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Nuclear education and training organizations; Emergency preparedness and response personnelSiting/Site Evaluation; Design; Construction; Commissioning; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=86
  
195
15
In preparing for the response to a possible nuclear emergency, it is necessary to consider emergencies that could involve severe damage to nuclear fuel in the reactor core or to spent fuel on the site, including those involving several units at a multi-unit plant possibly occurring at the same time as a natural disaster.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of the failure to maintain fundamental safety functions; Assessment of the plant in relation to external eventsProtecting emergency workers; Protecting the publicRadiation exposure; Radiation protectionEmergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Nuclear Power Plants; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Radiation Waste Management, Decommissioning and Remediation; Research Reactors; Safety Assessment; Site EvaluationGovernment; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Nuclear education and training organizations; Emergency preparedness and response personnelOperationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=109
  
196
16
The emergency management system for response to a nuclear emergency needs to include clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the operating organization and for local and national authorities. The system, including the interactions between the operating organization and the authorities, needs to be regularly tested in exercises.
Accident management provisions and their implementation; Assessment of beyond design basis accidents and accident management; Assessment of human and organizational factorsInitial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the public; Protecting emergency workersGovernmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework; Management Systems; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Safety Assessment; Site Evaluation; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsGovernment; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Nuclear education and training organizationsCommissioning; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110
  
197
17
Emergency workers need to be designated, assigned clearly specified duties, regardless of which organization they work for, be given adequate training, and be properly protected during an emergency. Arrangements need to be in place to integrate into the response those emergency workers who had not been designated prior to the emergency, and helpers who volunteer to assist in the emergency response.
Assessment of human and organizational factorsProtecting emergency workersRadiation exposure; Radiation protectionRadiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Research Reactors; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsOperators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnelCommissioning; Operation; Decommissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110
  
198
18
Arrangements need to be in place to allow decisions to be made on the implementation of predetermined urgent protective actions for the public, based on predefined plant conditions.
Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the publicRadiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsGovernment; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); Emergency preparedness and response personnel; NGOsOperation; Decommissioning; Commissioninghttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110
  
199
19
Arrangements need to be in place to enable urgent protective actions to be extended or modified in response to developing plant conditions or monitoring results. Arrangements are also needed to enable early protective actions to be initiated on the basis of monitoring results.
Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the publicRadiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Nuclear Power Plants; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsGovernment; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO); NGOsCommissioning; Decommissioning; Operationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=110
  
200
20
Arrangements need to be in place to ensure that protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear emergency do more good than harm. A comprehensive approach to decision making needs to be in place to ensure that this balance is achieved.
Initial response in Japan to the accident; Protecting the publicRadiation protectionRadiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Nuclear Power Plants; Fuel Cycle Facilities; Research Reactors; Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities; Transport of Radioactive MaterialsGovernment; Operators; Regulatory Bodies; Other relevant authorities; Emergency preparedness and response personnel; NGOs; Technical and Scientific Organizations (R&D, TSO)Construction; Commissioning; Decommissioning; Operationhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf#page=111
  
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