BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY
A regulation should not be elaborated an isolated element of a regulatory framework. Safety regulations are often interconnected and/or have interdependencies so that altogether generate a complete regulatory framework for safety.
It is of the utmost importance to avoid discrepancies and unnecessary overlaps between regulations to achieve a stable and consistent regulatory framework. Particular attention should be placed on handling properly the interfaces between safety regulations (for example, regulation covering the basic radiation safety principle should be consistent with the regulation specific practices or activities, like the transport of radioactive material), but also the interfaces between safety and security regulations so that safety measures do not harm the effect of security measures and vice versa.
In order to handle interdependencies and interfaces between regulations, It could be useful to develop a model representing the organization of the existing legal and regulatory framework (“as it is”), including interconnection between laws and regulations, and a conceptual model with the desired organization of the legal and regulatory framework once completed in the future (“as envisaged”). The model representing the organization of the “as it is” framework may have gaps, weak points and even inconsistencies that should be progressively eliminated along developing the “as envisaged” organization of the legal and regulatory framework.
The comparison between the “as it is” and the “as envisaged” framework, together with the gap analysis of the existing provisions, should also be the basis to define priorities for elaborating new or revising existing regulations.
Developing a conceptual model of the “as envisaged” legal and regulatory framework may not be an easy task, particularly if the starting point is too distant from “as envisaged” framework. The process of completing the regulatory framework for radiation safety can take several years, even decades in some cases, which brings important uncertainties into the process. For instance, relevant milestones in the national context (e.g. the revision of existing laws or the ratification of international conventions) or in the internal context (e.g. new international safety standards, new technologies…) can significantly alter the “as envisaged” framework. Because of that, the “as envisaged” framework should be taken as a living tool that need to be periodically revised and updated as the development of the framework progresses.
