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The potential implications of new safety issues need to be assessed without delay, and interim compensatory actions need to be taken to maintain the safety margin pending final confirmation of the problem.
New safety issues could arise from research findings, new analytical methods or learning from experience. The consideration and effective implementation of interim actions need to be part of the operating experience programme. It is vital in any nuclear organization that senior decision makers and managers have sufficient knowledge and experience to recognize and understand the nuclear safety significance of new information, and to apply a strong questioning attitude to challenge the organization to consider all potential nuclear safety consequences and potential mitigating actions. While operators have the primary responsibility for implementing operating experience, it is important for regulators to have authority to require operators to take action when they deem that operation of the NPP poses an unreasonable risk to the public.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 2 - Safety Assessment
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV2-Web.pdf#page=169 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Objective risk informed decision making criteria need to be used to support decisions for retrofitting safety design improvements as part of a periodic safety review process.
Risk assessment tools (e.g. PSAs) used to support risk informed decision making need to take account of all hazards, all operation modes and all potential sources of radioactive releases.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 2 - Safety Assessment
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV2-Web.pdf#page=169 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Regulatory bodies need to perform independent reviews of national and international operating experience to confirm that licensees are taking appropriate action in response to operating experience.
This does not override the primary responsibility of the operators for implementing operating experience.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 2 - Safety Assessment
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV2-Web.pdf#page=169 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
In preparing for the response to a possible nuclear emergency, it is necessary to consider emergencies that could involve severe damage to nuclear fuel in the reactor core or to spent fuel on the site, including those involving several units at a multi-unit plant possibly occurring at the same time as a natural disaster.
Consideration needs to be given to the possibility of a severe nuclear accident, irrespective of the cause, possibly involving more than one unit at a site and occurring simultaneously with a natural disaster, which could result in disruption at the site and of the local infrastructure. Systems, communications and monitoring equipment for providing essential information for both on-site and off-site responses need to be able to function under such circumstances. Facilities where the response will be managed (e.g. on-site and off-site emergency response centres) need to be selected or designed to be operational under a full range of emergency conditions (radiological, working and environmental conditions), and need to be suitably located and/or protected so as to ensure their operability and habitability under such conditions.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=36 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
The emergency management system for response to a nuclear emergency needs to include clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the operating organization and for local and national authorities. The system, including the interactions between the operating organization and the authorities, needs to be regularly tested in exercises.
Arrangements are needed that integrate the response to a nuclear emergency with the response to natural disasters and human-made disasters (e.g. earthquakes, floods and fires). The on-site response needs to be managed by personnel located at the site who have knowledge of the plant and of the situation. The on-site and off-site responses need to be coordinated based on pre-planned arrangements.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=37 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
There is a need for arrangements to conduct mitigatory actions for the full range of postulated emergencies, including emergencies not considered in the design basis (e.g. severe fuel damage) and those involving several units at a multi-unit plant.
In developing these arrangements, there is a need to consider the response of the personnel, instrumentation and systems of the facility under different emergency conditions. This includes the development, maintenance and testing of plans and procedures for responding to severe reactor accidents, including immediate response actions and those for staffing emergency response positions, particularly in the case of long lasting emergencies involving multiple units. The mitigatory actions need to be agreed on at the preparedness stage and then implemented on-site in an emergency response without consultation with, and/or request for approval by, off-site officials.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=37 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements are needed to enable the on-site emergency response organization (ERO) to provide and receive assistance (including heavy equipment) for performing mitigatory actions in an emergency, particularly in the case of long lasting emergencies and emergencies involving several units at a multi-unit plant.
These arrangements need to ensure that the assistance received (e.g. equipment) is compatible with existing on-site capabilities under different emergency conditions.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=37 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Emergency workers need to be designated, assigned clearly specified duties, regardless of which organization they work for, given adequate training, and be properly protected during an emergency. Arrangements need to be in place to integrate into the response those emergency workers who had not been designated prior to the emergency.
Account needs to be taken of those who may not have been designated as emergency workers at the preparedness stage. Dose criteria for emergency workers need to be set in advance and applied in a consistent manner for the assigned emergency duties.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=54 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements need to be pre-planned for members of the public (referred to as helpers) who volunteer to assist in response actions to be integrated into the emergency response organization and to be afforded an adequate level of radiation protection.
The arrangements need to include measures for their safety, including dose criteria to be applied, registration and integration within the emergency response organization and training (‘just-in-time’ instructions before undertaking the assigned duties) prior to the start of their work.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=55 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
There is a need to involve non-governmental organizations in establishing adequate emergency arrangements at the preparedness stage to facilitate their effective support to the overall emergency response.
This needs to cover the identification of their roles, the development of procedures and the provision of training.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=55 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements for the protection of emergency workers need to be elaborated in detail in the relevant emergency plans and procedures.
These plans and procedures need to be routinely tested to ensure their effective implementation. The arrangements need to include: those for ensuring the operability and habitability of emergency response facilities under a range of hazardous conditions; those for ensuring the well-being of emergency workers; and those for timely communication of doses incurred and associated health risks to emergency workers.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=55 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
There is a need for the training of emergency workers in the implementation of measures and actions for their protection in an emergency, with specific emphasis on severe environmental and radiological conditions.
Training programmes, including drills and exercises, need to cover the use of personal protective equipment, self-protective measures and actions to prevent inadvertent ingestion.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=55 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements for medical preparedness and response in relation to emergency workers need to be detailed and integrated in the overall emergency planning.
These arrangements need to take into account the necessity to promptly provide medical care to emergency workers and to function under severe environmental and radiological conditions.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=55 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements need to be in place to allow decisions to be made on the implementation of predetermined urgent protective actions for the public based on predefined plant conditions.
These arrangements are necessary because decision support systems, including those using computer models, may not be able to predict the size and timing of a radioactive release (the source term), the movement of plumes, deposition levels or resulting doses quickly or accurately enough in an emergency to be able to provide the sole basis for decisions on initial urgent protective actions. At the preparedness stage, there is a need to develop an emergency classification system based on observable conditions and measurable criteria (emergency action levels). This system enables the declaration of an emergency shortly after the detection of conditions at a plant that indicate actual or projected damage to the fuel and initiation of predetermined urgent protective actions for the public (in the predefined zones) promptly following classification of the emergency by the operator. This emergency classification system needs to cover a full range of abnormal plant conditions.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements need to be in place to enable urgent protective actions to be extended or modified in response to developing plant conditions or monitoring results. Arrangements are also needed to enable early protective actions to be initiated on the basis of monitoring results.
At the preparedness stage, there is a need to establish arrangements to, among others: (1) define emergency planning zones and areas; (2) establish dose and operational criteria (levels of measurable quantities) for taking urgent protective actions and other response actions, including dealing with special population groups within emergency zones (e.g. patients in hospitals); (3) enable urgent protective actions to be taken before or shortly after a release of radioactive material; (4) enable prompt establishment of access controls in areas where urgent protective actions are in place; (5) extend protective actions beyond the established emergency planning zones and areas if necessary; (6) establish dose and operational criteria for taking early protective actions and other response actions, e.g. relocation and food restrictions, that are justified and optimized, taking into account a range of factors such as radiological and non-radiological consequences, including economic, social and psychological consequences; and (7) establish arrangements for revision of operational criteria for taking early protective actions on the basis of the prevailing conditions. Emergency planning zones and areas, within which arrangements for the implementation of urgent and other protective actions are made, need to be established with severe nuclear emergencies taken into account. Such zones are to be established at the preparedness stage as part of a comprehensive protection strategy. There is also a need to establish arrangements to extend actions beyond the established planning zones and areas, if needed under conditions prevailing in an emergency. As part of preparedness for urgent protective actions, sheltering needs to be considered as a short term protective action, accompanied by iodine thyroid blocking. Arrangements need to take into account the possibility of restricting consumption and distribution of possibly contaminated local produce, milk from grazing animals and drinking water before the monitoring and analysis of samples are carried out.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements need to be in place to ensure that protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear emergency do more good than harm. A comprehensive approach to decision making needs to be in place to ensure that this balance is achieved.
These arrangements need to be developed with a clear understanding of the full range of possible health hazards presented in a nuclear emergency and of the potential radiological and non-radiological consequences of any protective actions. Protective actions need to be taken in a timely and safe manner, taking into account possible unfavourable conditions (e.g. severe weather or damage to infrastructure). Preparations in advance are necessary to ensure the safe evacuation of special facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes. Continued care or supervision must be provided for those who need it. The need for the provision of instructions to all categories of farmers and for assisting those individuals who have been relocated also needs to be addressed.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=110 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Arrangements need to be in place to assist decision makers, the public and others (e.g. medical staff) to gain an understanding of radiological health hazards in a nuclear emergency in order to make informed decisions on protective actions. Arrangements also need to be in place to address public concerns locally, nationally and internationally.
Public concerns need to be effectively addressed in a nuclear emergency. This includes the means to relate measurable quantities (e.g. dose rates) and projected radiation doses to radiological health hazards in a manner that allows decision makers (and the public) to make informed decisions concerning protective actions. Addressing public concerns contributes to mitigating both the radiological and the non-radiological consequences of the emergency. These arrangements need to ensure prompt explanation of any health risks and possible appropriate individual actions for reducing these risks. Arrangements need to be in place to provide the public with useful, consistent and understandable information throughout a nuclear emergency, including an answer to the public’s principal concern about potential health consequences; and to provide the public with an explanation of the basis for protective action recommendations. International concerns could be addressed, in part, by means of certification systems to demonstrate that tradable goods meet international standards and to reassure importing States and the public.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=111 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Medical staff (health care professionals) need to be trained in basic medical response to a nuclear emergency and in adequate management of (possibly) contaminated patients to avoid delays in the treatment of injured people.
Facilities that could be used as potential reception centres for triage, screening, decontamination and primary care of patients (either emergency workers or the public) need to be identified at the preparedness stage to facilitate the mobilization of resources during an emergency. Those treating or transporting contaminated patients would need to take the same kinds of precautions that would normally be applied when dealing with potentially infectious patients.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=111 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Emergency arrangements need to include provisions at the preparedness stage for implementing restrictions on the use and distribution of non-food commodities which have been, or could be, contaminated as a result of the emergency.
Generic and operational criteria are needed to assess, where necessary, the adequacy of goods for use and distribution, and to establish a system for ensuring that controls are placed on those goods intended for international trade. These arrangements need to minimize major disruptions in international trade, while ensuring protection of the public.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=111 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
Radioactive waste arising from the emergency needs to be managed in a manner that does not compromise the protection strategy.
Detailed technical guidance for the management of radioactive waste, including food waste and waste generated from decontamination and remediation activities, needs to be developed at the preparedness stage. The guidance needs to include consideration that possible locations for facilities to store the radioactive waste on an interim basis and for long term disposal may need to be identified in advance. These arrangements need to be determined and agreed with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, such as the local communities, at the preparedness stage.
Reference Document: The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response
Link to Reference Document: <a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=111 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a>
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