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Arrangements need to be developed at the preparedness stage for termination of protective actions and other response actions, and transition to the recovery phase. |
At the preparedness stage there is a need to plan for the transition from the emergency phase to the long term recovery phase, and for resumption of normal social and economic activities. The arrangements need to: (1) establish formal processes to decide on the termination of protective actions and other response actions; (2) clearly allocate responsibilities; (3) establish criteria for the termination of protective actions and other response actions; and (4) provide a strategy and process for consulting the public. Transitioning may differ from one location to another in the affected areas. This may result in complex and simultaneous applications of different requirements specific to the exposure situation in each area. This needs to be clarified and clearly communicated to all organizations and the public at the preparedness stage to avoid raising concerns that some members of the public or some workers are less protected than others in the transition phase. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=128 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Timely analysis of an emergency and the response to it, drawing out lessons and identifying possible improvements, enhances emergency arrangements. |
Such an analysis needs to include a review of all relevant arrangements, including national laws and regulations, allocation of authorities and responsibilities, emergency response plans and procedures, facilities, equipment, training and exercises. Analysis provides a basis for revision of the arrangements, as necessary. The adequacy of revised emergency arrangements needs to be demonstrated through exercises. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=127 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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The implementation of international arrangements for notification and assistance needs to be strengthened. |
Awareness of international arrangements for notification and assistance in a nuclear or radiological emergency, as well as existing operational mechanisms, needs to be increased, including mechanisms and procedures for notification and information exchange, for requesting and providing international assistance, etc. There is a need for enhanced training and exercises on the operational aspects of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. Participation in existing mechanisms for the provision of international assistance under the Assistance Convention needs to be an integral part of national emergency preparedness efforts. Arrangements need to be in place at the preparedness stage for requesting and receiving assistance (on the basis of bilateral agreements or under the Assistance Convention) in a nuclear or radiological emergency. Lists of officially designated contact points, as required under the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention, need to be continuously updated and prepared for immediate requests for information from the IAEA. Application of the IAEA safety standards on emergency preparedness and response at the national level would improve preparedness and response, facilitate communication in an emergency and contribute to the harmonization of national criteria for protective actions and other response actions. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=170 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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There is a need to improve consultation and sharing of information among States on protective actions and other response actions. |
Consultation and sharing of information on protective actions and other response actions among States in an emergency helps to ensure that actions are taken consistently. In addition, a clear and understandable explanation of the technical basis for decisions on protective actions and other response action is crucial in order to increase public understanding and acceptance at both the national and international levels. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=170 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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There is a need for the IAEA Secretariat to provide States, international organizations and the public with timely, clear, factually correct, objective and easily understandable information during the nuclear emergency on its potential radiological consequences and the prognosis of possible emergency progression. |
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Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=170 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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There is a need for continuous enhancements and exercising of the inter-agency coordination mechanism in the EPR area, and for further strengthening the role of the IACRNE. |
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Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV3-Web.pdf#page=170 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Prompt quantification and characterization of the amount and composition of radioactive material released to the environment are needed following an NPP accident. For significant releases, a comprehensive and coordinated programme of long term environmental monitoring is necessary to determine the nature and extent of the radiological impact on the environment at the local, regional and global levels. |
The quantification and characterization of the source term of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP proved to be difficult. Prompt monitoring of the environment provides confirmation of the levels of radionuclides and establishes the initial basis for protecting people. The results can be used to inform the public and to develop strategies for response and recovery activities. It is also important to continue environmental monitoring to verify that there are no further significant releases of radionuclides and to provide information to decision makers and other stakeholders on the possible redistribution of radionuclides in the environment over time. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=81 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Groundwater surveillance needs to continue. |
Radioactivity in groundwater is a local problem restricted to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. However, continued surveillance is needed to confirm that this continues to be the case in the longer term. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=81 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Personal radiation monitoring of representative groups of members of the public provides invaluable information for reliable estimates of radiation doses and needs to be used together with environmental measurements and appropriate dose estimation models for assessing public dose. |
The early estimation of doses was based on environmental dispersion modelling, resulting in some conservative assumptions on doses incurred and projected. Personal monitoring of 131I in the thyroids of children needs to be undertaken as soon as possible following radioiodine releases to the environment, owing to the short half-life (eight days) of this radionuclide. Personal monitoring of external radiation and the internal presence of the longer lived radionuclides (e.g. 137Cs) needs to be undertaken as soon as feasible and to continue over time, as appropriate. In the absence of personal radiation measurements, modelling of environmental and ambient data may be needed to estimate the radiation doses incurred by individuals. In these cases, the uncertainties associated with the assumptions used in the models need to be clearly explained, particularly if the results are being used to inform decision making on protective measures and actions or to estimate the potential for radiation induced health effects. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=136 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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While dairy products were not the main pathways for the ingestion of radioiodine in Japan, it is clear that the most important method of limiting thyroid doses, especially to children, is to restrict the consumption of fresh milk from grazing cows. |
The estimates of thyroid doses to children following the accident were low. This was the result of a combination of factors, including the time of year (before the growing season), agricultural practices in Japan, low consumption of cows’ milk by infants and the controls on milk consumption that were immediately introduced. These factors contributed to the low level of intake of 131I. This is in contrast to the situation following the Chernobyl accident, where the dominant intake pathway of 131I for children living in contaminated areas was ingestion intake, mainly due to consumption of fresh milk from cows grazing on pasture. People in contaminated areas were not immediately aware of the accident and continued to drink locally produced milk. This resulted in average equivalent dose to the thyroid of up to a few thousand mSv. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=136 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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A robust system is necessary for monitoring and recording occupational radiation doses, via all relevant pathways, particularly those due to internal exposure that may be incurred by workers during severe accident management activities. It is essential that suitable and sufficient personal protective equipment be available for limiting the exposure of workers during emergency response activities and that workers be sufficiently trained in its use. |
Early and continued direct measurements of the radiation exposure and the levels of radionuclides incorporated by emergency workers are the most valuable approach for obtaining information for estimating radiation risks and potential health effects and for optimizing protection. There is a need to monitor and register occupational radiation doses through a robust system of personal dosimeters and measurements. Monitoring of 131I in the thyroid needs to be undertaken as soon as possible. Immediately following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the provision of personal protective equipment for restricting the exposure of workers and monitoring was difficult. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=136 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Clearer guidelines on occupational medical management of potentially overexposed workers would be beneficial. It is necessary that people responsible for workers’ health have a clear understanding on how, when, for how long and to whom protective therapies need to be administered. |
The timely application of potassium iodide for blocking the thyroid gland is helpful for controlling workers’ thyroid doses. For some workers, taking potassium iodide is thought to have significantly reduced their thyroid exposures from inhalation of radioiodine. However, many workers used potassium iodide long after their intake had ceased. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=136 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Following an accident, it is essential to provide personal radiation monitors to the affected population, because direct personal measurements are much more reliable than reconstructing such doses through environmental modelling and assumptions about personal behaviour. |
Early and follow-up direct measurements of levels of dose and incorporation of radionuclides in members of the public are the most valuable way of obtaining information on the radiological impact of an accident and for providing public information. In particular, measurements of 131I in thyroid should be taken as soon as possible following releases to the environment, owing to its short half-life. If direct measurements are not available, modelling and assumptions of transfer parameters may be required to estimate the doses received as long as its limitations in accuracy are recognized. When estimating doses using modelling techniques that are based on environmental measurements and estimates of the amount of radionuclides released, the relatively large uncertainties associated with these estimates should be recognized and clearly explained. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=137 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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The comparisons of assessments from various organizations would be simplified if a common monitoring protocol were developed which included ranges of doses to report, how to report doses below detection limits and how to take background radiation into account. |
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Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=137 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Relevant international bodies need to develop explanations of the principles and criteria for radiation protection that are understandable for non-specialists in order to make their application clearer for decision makers and the public. As some protracted protection measures were disruptive for the affected people, a better communication strategy is needed to convey the justification for such measures and actions to all stakeholders, including the public. |
There is a recognized need for simple explanations of a number of radiation protection issues, including: • Differences between the concepts of dose limits and reference levels and the associated rationale; • Criteria for the justification of protective measures and actions aimed at averting radiation doses in the long term, in particular when they involve significant disruptions to normal life; • Specific situations relating to the radiation protection of emergency workers. The principles of radiation protection are based not solely on science but also on value judgements based on ethical principles. In some circumstances, protective measures and actions involve protracted social disruption. Under these circumstances, the potential benefit from avoiding radiation doses must outweigh the individual and social detriment caused by the protective measures and actions themselves. It is important to explain to stakeholders the justification for long standing radiation protection measures and actions. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=157 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Conservative decisions related to specific activity and activity concentrations in consumer products and deposition activity led to extended restrictions and associated difficulties. In a prolonged exposure situation, consistency among international standards, and between international and national standards, is beneficial, particularly those associated with drinking water, food, non-edible consumer products and deposition activity on land. |
The current international system for controlling radioactivity in consumer products is governed by distinct guidance, e.g. the Codex Alimentarius for food (including bottled water) in international trade, IAEA safety standards for food and drinking water for use in an emergency, WHO guidelines for drinking water in existing exposure situations and IAEA safety standards for non-edible products for exemption purposes. There is a need for harmonization among the international standards for acceptable levels of radioactivity in products for public consumption in order to facilitate their application by regulatory bodies and their understanding by the public. National standards need to be in line with international standards, where this is feasible. Moreover, there is a need for criteria for dealing with the protracted presence of radionuclides on land. Guidance also needs to be developed for international trade to control of contaminated non-edible commodities. There is a need for transparency in the derivation and implementation of reference levels of activity in food and other commodities to facilitate understanding. The terminology used needs to be clarified. Moreover, existing guidelines do not fully address commodities assessed by measuring surface activity (there is a need for criteria in terms of Bq/cm2). A review is needed to identify any gaps in existing international standards and to identify the work necessary to achieve an international consensus on such standards. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=158 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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Education and training in radiation protection should be continuous for all stakeholders and should be regularly updated. |
There is always room for even more preparation in radiation protection. While radiation protection was successful, given the scale of the earthquake and tsunami and the concomitant nuclear accident, some gaps in procedures occurred; the experience needs to be used to achieve further improvements and resilience should accident an accident occur in the future. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=158 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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The risks of radiation exposure and the attribution of health effects to radiation need to be clearly presented to stakeholders, making it unambiguous that any increases in the occurrence of health effects in populations are not attributable to exposure to radiation, if levels of exposure are similar to the global average background levels of radiation. |
In the case of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, doses to members of the public were low and comparable with typical global average background doses. There is a need to clearly inform the public, particularly the people affected, that no discernible increased incidence of radiation related health effects is expected among exposed members of the public and their descendants as a result of the accident. An understanding of radiation and its possible health effects is important for all those involved in an emergency, in particular for physicians, nurses, radiation technologists and medical first responders. This needs to be ensured through appropriate education and training of medical professionals in the topics of radioactivity, radiation and health effects associated with radiation exposure. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=178 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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After a nuclear accident, health surveys are very important and useful, but should not be interpreted as epidemiological studies. The results of such health surveys are intended to provide information to support medical assistance to the affected population. |
The Fukushima Health Management Survey provides valuable health information for the local community, helping to ensure that any health effects are detected quickly, and that appropriate actions are taken to protect the health of the population. The overall results of health checks may provide important information, but they should not be misinterpreted as the results of an epidemiological assessment. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=179 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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There is a need for radiological protection guidance to address the psychological consequences to members of the affected populations in the aftermath of radiological accidents. A Task Group of the ICRP has recommended that “strategies for mitigating the serious psychological consequences arising from radiological accidents be sought”. |
Psychological conditions have been reported as a consequence of the accident. This has been a repeated issue in the aftermath of accidents involving radiation exposure. In spite of its importance, these consequences have not been recognized in international recommendations and standards on radiological protection. |
Reference Document:
The Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Volume 4 - Radiological Consequences |
Link to Reference Document:
<a href=http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/AdditionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf#page=179 target='_blank' alt='Open site in new window'><img src='/FukushimaLessonsLearned/Images1/Thumbnails/external-link-xxl.gif' style='height:25px; width:25px;' /></a> |
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