| Nuclear Security Regime (Module 1) | |
| List of activities within the module | This module is required for every Modules of INSServ mission |
| Purpose | To assess and provide recommenations based on "NSS Essential elements" |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, educators, law enforcement and State officials/Government |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 3 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | None as module, but integrated in full INSServ mission |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 1 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission.. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 3 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 1 report should be treated as restricted |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Overview of Security of Nuclear Material and Associated Facilities (Module 2) | |
| List of activities within the module | Laws and regulations related to security of nuclear material, facilities and activities. General overview of NM, associated facilities and associated activities. Bilateral and multilateral assistance. |
| Purpose | To understand the activities involving nuclear material and nuclear facilities in the country. Overview of implementation of IPPAS recommendations, if any, and assess the needs of requesting IPPAS mission by the country. Assess general recommendations from NSS 13: Recomendations NM |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, site security organization, law enforcement organizations |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer, expert in nuclear material and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 4 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month. |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | None as module, but integrated in full INSServ mission |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 2 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 4 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 2 report is confidential. |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Overview of Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Activities (Module 3) | |
| List of activities within the module | Laws and regulations related to the security of radioactive material, facilities and activities. General overview of RM, associated facilities and associated activities. Bilateral and multilateral assistance. |
| Purpose | To understand activities involving radioactive material and facilities in the country. Radioactive sources and disused radioactive sources inventories. Detection of radioactive sources at scrap yard. Procedures in place for radioactive sources out of regulatory control. Overview of implementation of related IPPAS recommendations, if any, and assess the needs of requesting IPPAS mission by the country. Assess security recommendations based on Code of Conduct and guidelines on Export and Import, and general recommendations from NSS 14: Recomendations RM |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, site security organization, law enforcement organizations |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer, expert in radioactive sources and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 4 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | None as module, but integrated in full INSServ mission |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 3 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 4 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 3 report is confidential |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Overview of Nuclear Security during Transport (Module 4) | |
| List of activities within the module | Laws and regulations related to security during transport. Security measures and procedures in place |
| Purpose | To assess and provide recommenations based on NSS 9 |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, consignees |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer, expert on safety and security during transport, law enforcement organizations and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 5 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | Pilot project |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 4 in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission.. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 5 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 4 report is confidencial |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Nuclear Detection Architecture and Effective Border Control (Module 5) | |
| List of activities within the module | Criminal code, laws and regulations from public security, customs and border security organizations. Sites visits. Bilateral and multilaterial assistance |
| Purpose | To assess national capability to detect and respond to nuclear security events. To assess implementation of recommendations based on NSS 15. Assess needs for effective border control or at major pulic events |
| Audience[1] | Law enforcement organizations, regulators and State officials/Government |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer, radiation detection equipment specialist, public security law enforcement officer and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 6 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | 3 per year |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 5 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 6 working days, (3) visits logistic arrangements (4) translation of the report to English or official language, and (5) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 5 report is confidential |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Crisis and Consequence Management for Nuclear Security Events (Module 6) | |
| List of activities within the module | To understand national laws and regulations and criminal codes preventing nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control. Prepare assessment of National Response Plan. Evaluate coordination of relevant law enforcement organizations and response operations. Identify links between law enforcement and forensics laboratories. Bilateral and multilaterial assistance |
| Purpose | To assess national capability to manage crises and radiological crime scenes and capability to support effective criminal prosecution relevant to nuclear security |
| Audience | Law enforcement, prosecutor general, forensics expert and State officials/Government. |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, lawyer, law enforcement, forensics expert and editor, as appropriate. |
| Duration | 6 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | New module |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 6 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 6 working days, (3) visits logistic arrangements (4) translation of the report to English or official language, and (5) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 6 report is confidential |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Nuclear Forensics Capability (Module 7) | |
| List of activities within the module | Definition of nuclear forensics and attribution. Introduction to Model Action Plan. Assessment of existing capabilities for conventional forensics and evidence collection. Identify equipment and expertise for baseline categorization. Technical connection to international community. Bilateral and multilaterial assistance |
| Purpose | To raise awareness, assess national capabilityand to provide recommendations based on NSS No.2. |
| Audience | Law enforcement, prosecutor general, forensics expert, State officials/Government, regulators, technical support organizations. |
| Team composition | IAEA team leader, law enforcement, expert in nuclear and radioactive material and editor, as appropriate. |
| Duration | 5 working days, as stand alone Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within one month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | New module |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 7 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 5 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 6 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 7 report is confidential |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |
| Nuclear Security Human Resource Development (Module 8) | |
| List of activities within the module | Assessment of training needs, capability and infrastructure at organizations relevant to nuclear segurity. |
| Purpose | To assess training and capacity building needs |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, educators, law enforcement and State officials/Government |
| Team composition | IAEA Team leader, law enforcement official, expert in nuclear and radioactive material and editor, as appropriated |
| Duration | 3 working days, as stand along Module. |
| Expected output | It is expected a draft report at exit meeting and a final report available within on month |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | None as module, but integrated in full INSServ mission |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up Module 8 or full INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 3 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of Contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | The Module 8 report should be treated as restricted |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |