| Peer Review Service: INSServ - International Nuclear Security Service | |
| List of modules | (1) Nuclear Security Regime, (2) Overview of security of Nuclear Material and Associated Facilities; (3) Overview of security of Radioactive Material and associated activities; (4) Overview of security during transport; (5) Nuclear Detection Architecture and Effective Border Control; (6) Crisis and Consequence Management for Nuclear Security Events; (7) Nuclear Forensics Capability; (8) Human Resource Development. |
| Purpose | The
purpose of an INSServ is to ensure that the IAEA has the knowledge and full
understanding of the activities being carried out in a State in all the
aspects of its nuclear security regime. From the analysis of the information,
an accurate assessment of needs can be made and an INSSP can be developed or
improved on the basis of the findings and recommendations. In that respect,
the key objectives of the INSServ are to: • understand and collect information available (within the IAEA and from the country) about a country’s nuclear security regime and activities; • analyse and evaluate the information using appropriate IAEA guidance and accepted international practice to identify possible needs for further work and assistance; and • use the information as basis for developing an INSSP or improve an existing INSSP to establish a timetable for further actions that need to be undertaken by the State and the IAEA, including activities to be implemented by the State and provision of assistance by the IAEA and possible donors. |
| Audience | Regulators, operators, educators, law enforcement and State officials/Government |
| Team composition | The team will consist of a (1) team leader and experts depending on the extent of the service and modules covered, in various aspects of nuclear security, e.g. (2) lawyer: laws and regulations relevant to nuclear security, (3) expert on security of nuclear/radioactive material and associated facilities, (4) expert on detection and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear/radioactive material and (5) Editor, as apropriate. Each of the experts is likely to have, in addition to a particular area of expertise, knowledge about the IAEA and international recommendations and good practices and other national approaches. |
| Duration | The standard INSServ duration is six working days. Upon request from the MS, specific Modules could be added or recommended and the duration of the mission could be extended. |
| Expected output | It is expected to have a full draft of the report at the time of the exit meeting and a final report available within one month. |
| Average usage in 2005-2010 | Average over the period of eight plus missions per year |
| Recommended frequency | Follow up INSServ in 3-4 years of implementation of recommendations provided in the first mission. |
| Resource requirements | (1) Administrative support, (2) travel expenses for the team during 6 working days, (3) translation of the report to English or official language, and (4) 5 working days for finalization of the report. |
| Prerequisites | Official request from the Member State (2) assigment of counterpart in position to gather relevant nuclear security organizations in the country, (3) agreed terms of reference, (4) Pre-mission report |
| Point of contact in IAEA | Peter Colgan: p.colgan@iaea.org |
| Public outreach | THE INSServ report is confidential |
| Required follow-up | Recommended every 3-4 years or upon request from the Member State |